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By the end of 1965 the Uniform Commercial Code had been
enacted in forty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands, and further enactments were expected during
1966.1 In January 1966 it was already in force in all but ten
of the enacting jurisdictions, and had been in actual operation
for more than ten years in Pennsylvania. It was more than a
theoretical proposal.
Article 2 on Sales replaces the Uniform Sales Act, promul-
gated in 1906 and enacted in some thirty-six jurisdictions by
1941. The forty-two Code states include eleven which like
Louisiana had never adopted the Uniform Sales Act ;2 by the
end of 1965 all but three states3 had enacted one or the other.
The Sales Act was based on the English Sales of Goods Act,
1893, which in turn was largely a codification of English com-
mon law decisions rendered during the 19th century.
The Code, like the previous statutory revisions, has pre-
served much of the basic structure of the English law of sales.
But modern commercial practice is reflected in section after
section. In 1939, the year before the Code project was born,
Professor Llewellyn, who later became the chief draftsman of
the Code, urged "that the time is overdue to make one more
attempt to unhorse the law of wares. ' '4 In 1940, in discussing a
proposal then pending for the enactment of a Federal Sales Act,
Professor Isaacs said that a future archaeologist, analyzing the
Uniform Act or the federal adaptation, might well conclude
*Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School.
1. The enacting jurisdictions are listed in the UCC volumes of the UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED (Supp. 1964). Enactments during 1965 leave Arizona, Dela-
ware, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont
as the states where the Code has not been enacted.
2. Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, North
Carolina, Virginia, Texas, West Virginia.
3. Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina.
4. See Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939),
The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REv. 873, 904 (1939).
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that the middleman had scarcely emerged, that credit was un-
usual, that the normal buyer was expected to carry his own
goods away - in short, he said, "the framework of our Sales
Act is roughly of the Eighteenth Century."5
The Code builds anew on that framework. The Code provi-
sions do not focus on the passage of title to a horse; they refer
again and again to the "merchant," to standardized contract
terms, and to problems of credit, shipment, and storage. The
most pervasive change from the Sales Act is a shift from prop-
erty to contract. In the words of the opening Comment to ar-
ticle 2:
"The arrangement of the present Article is in terms of
contract for sale and the various steps of its performance.
The legal consequences are stated as following directly from
the contract and action taken under it without resorting to
the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as
being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid
making practical issues between practical men turn upon
the location of an intangible something, the passing of which
no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such
abstractions proof of words and actions of a tangible char-
acter."
Article 2 contains 104 sections, of which about one-third have
no counterpart in the Sales Act. The new provisions relate for
the most part to questions which I was brought up to think of
as contracts questions rather than sales questions. Accordingly,
I propose to devote this first lecture to contractual obligations
in the sale of goods. The second lecture will deal with property,
creditors' rights, and what Professor Gilmore calls "the commer-
cial doctrine of good faith purchase."
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
Section 2-401 of the Code provides for the passage of title
to goods, but separate provisions are made for rights and obli-
gations, performance and risk, breach, repudiation and excuse,
and remedies; and section 2-401 provides that each such provi-
sion applies "irrespective of title." This de-emphasis of title
or property is accompanied by expanded treatment of contract




law affecting sales. Examples of provisions not found in the
Sales Act are contained in the Code sections on parol evidence
(§ 2-202), definiteness (§H 2-204, 2-305 through 2-311), offer
and acceptance (§§ 2-205 through 2-207), assignment, and dele-
gation (§ 2-210), unconscionable contracts and clauses (§ 2-302),
and definitions of trade terms such as "F.O.B." and "C.I.F."
(§ 2-319 through 2-325). In addition there are novel general
provisions in article 1, limited either explicitly or by fair im-
plication to transactions within the scope of the more specific
articles: waiver of claim after breach (§ 1-107), prima facie
evidence by third party documents (§ 1-202), obligation of good
faith (§ 1-203), reservation of rights (§ 1-207).
Some of these provisions restate and codify common law or
equitable principles; others are new in substance as well as in
their statutory form. The same is true of the provisions which
replace Sales Act sections on the same subject. Probably the
most significant innovations in article 2 are made with respect
to the Statute of Frauds (§ 2-201), "firm" offers (§ 2-205),
"unconscionable" terms (§ 2-302), risk of loss (§§ 2-509, 2-510),
replevin by the buyer (H§ 2-502, 2-716), and the buyer's right
of rejection (§§ 2-508, 2-601, 2-612, 2-614). Clearly there are
enough changes, both in form and in substance, to give signifi-
cance to the question of the scope of the Code's application.
Scope. The questions of coverage can be divided under three
separate headings: type of transaction, territorial application,
and effective date. The effective date is the easiest: it is speci-
fied in the enacting statute, commonly a year or two after the
date of enactment. The other types of questions are illustrated
in the Massachusetts decision in Skinner v. Tober Foreign
Motors, Inc.6 In October 1959 an airplane was sold and delivered
in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts seller to Connecticut buy-
ers, to be kept in Connecticut. The seller retained a security
interest for the payment of the price in monthly installments
of $200. Before the first installment was due the buyers had to
replace the engine and could not bear the financial burden. The
seller orally agreed to reduce the monthly payments to $100 for
the first year, and the buyers made the reduced payments for
seven months, through May 1960. But in March the seller de-
manded resumption of the $200 payments and in May repos-
sessed and sold the airplane. The buyers sued for damages and
6. 345 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963).
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recovered the value of the airplane less the unpaid balance of the
price.
The court first held that the contract was governed by Massa-
chusetts law. Connecticut law might, under article 9, have gov-
erned the validity and perfection of the seller's security interest,
but the issue involved the duties of the parties under the pri-
mary obligation, the contract of sale. The transaction bore "an
appropriate relation" under section 1-105 to Massachusetts,
where the contract was executed, the plane delivered, and the
seller had its place of business. Since the Statute of Frauds
was not pleaded, the court did not reach the question of the
effect of delivery, acceptance, and part payment under section
2-201 (3) (c). And the oral modification needed no consideration
to be binding under section 2-209(1).
Article 2 is limited by section 2-102 to "transactions in
goods," except those "intended to operate only as security trans-
actions." "Goods" is defined in section 2-105 to exclude invest-
ment securities and things in action. Yet the comments to sections
1-102 and 2-105, citing a New York case under the Sales Act,7 in-
vite the application of particular sections by analogy to subject
matter intentionally excluded, and particularly to sale of securi-
ties, "where reason and policy so require." The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has noted the invitation without disapproval ;8
and Delaware courts, applying Pennsylvania law, seem to have
assumed without discussion that a sale of securities is a sale of
goods under article 2.9
Application by analogy to sale of securities suggests more
remote analogies. What of a construction contract involving an
incidental transfer of goods? What of leases of goods? What of
contracts for services? Indeed, what of contracts generally?
The answers to these questions are not yet known, of course.
7. Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934) ; cf. Thomas G. Jewett,
Jr., Inc. v. Keystone Driller Co., 282 Mass. 469, 185 N.E. 369 (1933) (condi-
tional sale) ; Blumberg v. Taggart, 213 Minn. 39, 5 N.W.2d 388 (1942) (transfer
of bank deposit) Morris F. Fogle Co. v. Lisman, 208 Wis. 1, 240, N.W. 869
(1932) (bonds) Loew's, Inc. v. Wolff, 101 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Calif. 1951),
affirmed, 215 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1954) (sale of literary property). Contra, Por-
ter v. Gibson, 25 Cal.2d 506, 154 P.2d 703 (1944) ; cf. Franck v. J. J. Sugarman-
Rudolph Co., 40 Cal.2d 81, 251 P.2d 949 (1952).
8. In re Carter's Claim, 390 Pa. 365, 134 A.2d 908 (1957). For the back-
ground of the Code comments, see Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 58 COLUAI. L. REV. 798, 810 (1958).
9. Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 166 A.2d 726 (Del. Ch. 1960),
appeal dismissed, 172 A.2d 63 (Del. 1961); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter,
200 A.2d 441 (Del. 1964).
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But a separate development has an even broader potential reach:
the Code has sometimes been relied on as a source of law in
jurisdictions where it was not in force. In a case arising before
it had been enacted anywhere, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit applied a Code rule and said :10
"We think provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which
do not conflict with statute or settled case law are entitled
to as much respect and weight as courts have been inclined
to give to the various Restatements. It, like the Restatement,
has the stamp of approval of a large body of American
scholarship."
Other courts also have used the Code as a Restatement, par-
ticularly in cases decided after enactment but governed by prior
law. And last year the Boards of Contract Appeals of both the
Armed Services and the Department of the Interior announced
that they regarded the Code as a source of the federal law gov-
erning contracts with the United States."
It is beyond my scope here to explore the implications of ap-
plication by analogy and use as Restatement. 12 Suffice it for the
present that there are implications and that these techniques,
coupled with widespread enactment, may greatly reduce the
need for recourse to choice-of-law principles in the law of sales.
It may be proper to add that these techniques are most appro-
priate where the Code rule has respectable common law ante-
cedents and makes no sharp break with local practices. But they
may also be legitimate where the analogy or the question
whether the Code applies is a close one, or where Code principles
10. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817, 822,
n.9 (3d Cir. 1951), cited with approval in Budget Plan, Inc. v. Savoy, 336 Mass.
322, 145 N.E.2d 710 (1957) ; see Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank
& Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958) ; cf. Haskins v. Dube, 101 N.H.
224, 138 A.2d 677 (1958) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960); Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910
(1954).
11. See Reeves Sounderaft Corp., ASBCA, June 30, 1964, 33 U.S.L. Week
2024; Federal Pacific Electric Co., Interior BCA, October 23, 1964, 33 U.S.L.
Week 2222.
12. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
(1934), reprinted in 2 1-ARv. J. LEGIS. 7 (1964). For general discussion of codi-
fication problems and the Code, see Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 330 (1951) ; Hawkland, Uniform
Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291; Kripke, The Principles
Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321;
Patterson, The Codification of Commercial Law in the Light of Jurisprudence,
[1955] 1 REP. N.Y. LAW REV. Comm. 41; Vold, Construing the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 50 CoRN. L.Q. 49 (1964).
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and supplementary principles need to be harmonized to protect
the legitimate expectations of the parties.
Offer and acceptance. Shortly before he began work on the
Code, Professor Llewellyn wrote a series of articles on "our case-
law of contracts" in which he attempted a comprehensive
analysis of problems of offer and acceptance. 3 Recently I have
had to review those articles, together with Code provisions on
the same subject, in connection with the revision of the Restate-
ment of Contracts. It was surprising how closely the Code pro-
visions followed the suggestions made in the Llewellyn articles,
and how ready we all were to accept both as sound restatement
of common law principles, not limited like the Code to sale of
goods. 14 Here I can deal only with a few highlights.
Section 2-205 on firm offers illustrates a variety of Code
techniques. First, as to continuity with prior law, the section
provides a substitute for the common law of sealed instruments,
which is made inapplicable to sale contracts by section 2-203.
The new formality is more limited in scope, and harmonizes
better with commercial practice. It does not displace other types
of option contracts based on consideration or, where recognized,
on the recital of consideration or the payment of a nominal con-
sideration. Second, as to scope, it applies to an offer "by a mer-
chant" to buy or sell goods. "Merchant" is a defined term; the
comment to section 2-104 indicates that almost every person in
business would be a merchant for this purpose, since "by his
occupation [he] holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices . . . involved." As to non-specialized
business practices, the comment says, banks or even universities
well may be merchants. It does not apply to a housewife or to
an offer with respect to services, but the possibility remains
that it may be extended by analogy in a proper case.' 5 Third,
the firm offer section is one exhibit in support of Professor
Llewellyn's statement that "one effort which may have some
small promise has been made," in the Code, to deal with the
13. See Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE
L.J. 1243 (1938), On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (Parts
I d II), 48 YALE L.J. 1, 779 (1938-1939).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS §§ 12, 19-74 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1964) ; Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J.
302 (1964).
15. Cf. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 200 A.2d 441 (Del. 1964) (§ 2-205
inapplicable because (1) section in terms applies only to merchants (2) trust
company had no power to option (3) offer gave no assurance it would be held
open; no reference to exclusion of securities from definition of goods).
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problem of the standardized form.16 In the case of a firm offer
"on a form supplied by the offeree," the section requires that
the provision be "separately signed by the offeror."
Section 2-206 implements Professor Llewellyn's assault on
what he called the "Great Dichotomy" between unilateral con-
tract and bilateral contract, a dichotomy, he said, which "has
little relation to the living fact of the business contracting which
it divides.' 7 Following a suggestion of Professor Whittier, it
is recognized that an offer may invite the offeree to choose be-
tween acceptance by promise and acceptance by performance. 8
The problem of notification to the offeror is dealt with sepa-
rately. Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated, an offer in-
vites "acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable
in the circumstances," and an order for current shipment of
goods can be accepted "either by a prompt promise to ship or by
the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-conform-
ing goods." Thus the same act can be both acceptance and
breach, just as a warranty can be broken when made. Probably
the pre-Code law was the same, 19 but it was not always so under-
stood.
Next we come to the Code's provisions on what is sometimes
called "the battle of the forms." Buyer orders goods, using his
standard order form; seller purports to accept on his standard
acknowledgment form, containing terms which do not match
those on the order form. Is there a contract? Or subsequent
correspondence shows that the parties both think they have a
contract, or the goods are shipped and paid for before any dis-
pute arises. What are the terms of the contract? Sections 2-204
and 2-207 codify decisions that "offer and acceptance are not
required to meet with geometric precision in order to form a
valid contract," where "the parties consistently acted as if they
had made a binding agreement. ' 20 And section 2-207 (2) and (3)
deal with the question what terms become part of the contract.
16. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION- DECIDING APPEALS 369
(1960).
17. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (Part
I), 48 YALE L.J. 779, 787, 789, 809 (1939).
18. See Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CALIF.
L. REV. 441, 453 (1929) ; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 28-31 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1964).
19. See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACT'S § 77 (1963).
20. See Franklin R. & D. Corp. v. Swift Elec. Sup. Co., 340 F.2d 439, 444
(2d Cir. 1964) (pre-Code Law of N. Y. or Conn.).
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According to these sections, "conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of a contract" may establish a contract
for sale, even though the moment of making is undetermined,
and even though the writings of the parties do not establish a
contract. "A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance
or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional
to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless accept-
ance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms." The additional terms (Note: not the "dif-
ferent" terms) are treated as proposals for modification; "be-
tween merchants," they are accepted by failure to object unless
they "materially alter" the contract. Where a contract is estab-
lished by conduct, the terms consist of those "on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary
terms incorporated under any other provisions" of the Code.
Two judicial opinions have applied these provisions to the
question whether a particular term was part of a contract.,
In the Roto-Lith case, a federal court was confronted with an
order for an adhesive for "wet pack spinach bags," sent from
New York to Massachusetts, where the Code was in force. The
Massachusetts seller sent acknowledgment and invoice forms
bearing a conspicuous no-warranty clause. The adhesive was
shipped, accepted, and paid for, but did not stick. The plain-
tiff buyer claimed that the clause was an additional term which
materially altered the contract and so did not become part of it.
The court agreed that there was a material alteration, but said
that on the plaintiff's reading "the statute would lead to an
absurdity. . . .The statute is not too happily drafted. . . .To
give the statute a practical construction we must hold that a
response which states a condition materially altering the obliga-
tion solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is [expressly con-
ditional]." Thus the seller made a counter-offer rather than an
acceptance, and the buyer became bound by the terms of the
counter-offer when it accepted the goods. The court did not
refer to section 2-207 (3), which as expounded in the comment
seems to call for a contrary result.
Doughboy Industries, decided by a New York court under
pre-Code law, shows a more sympathetic attitude toward the
21. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962)
Matter of Doughboy Industries Inc. (Pantasote Co.), 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233
N.Y.S.2d 488 (1st Dep't 1962).
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Code provisions. Again a buyer's order form failed to match
the seller's acknowledgment form, and the transaction went for-
ward in disregard of the conflict. The dispute was whether an
arbitration clause in the geller's form was part of the contract.
Each form contained a fighting clause, and the 'court said the
parties had "accomplished a legal equivalent to the irresistible
force colliding with the immovable object.". Having decided that
under the principles in force before the Code there was no agree-
ment to arbitrate, the court went. on to refer to the Code, which
had been enacted in New York but had not yet taken effect, as
"quite useful":
"But the problem of conflicting commercial forms is one
with which there has been much concern before this, and a
new effort at rational solution has been made. The new solu-
tion would yield a similar result. [The court then quoted
the comments to § 2-207.] On, this exposition, the arbitra-
tion clause, whether viewed as a material alteration under
subsection (2), or as a term nullified by a conflicting pro-
vision in the buyer's form, would fail to survive as a contract
term."
The hostile construction in the Roto-Lith case has been much
criticized, and it is to be hoped that when the occasion arises
the Massachusetts court will consider the matter anew and, like
the New York court in Doughboy Industries, seek to implement
rather than to frustrate the new effort at rational solution.
Two other aspects of contract formation require brief men-
tion. First, as indicated by the Skinner case described earlier,2
modification and discharge are treated separately from the
initial contract, and the requirement of consideration is elimin-
ated in cases of modification (§ 2-209; cf. §§ 1-107, 3-605). The
comment indicates that the general requirement of "good faith"
in the performance and enforcement of Code contracts bars
extortion of a "modification" without legitimate commercial
reason. Second, section 2-204 provides that "a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving
an appropriate remedy." The question of intent, at least if
not clearly resolved by the documents, is a question of fact to
22. See note 6 supra.
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be resolved- in the light of all relevant circumstances.2 The ap-
plication of this section is assisted by later sections which fill
in missing terms on performance, open price, remedies, and the
like (§§ 2-305 through 2-311). Probably the net effect is to en-
courage the granting of a remedy in cases of indefinite agree-
ments, in harmony with a growing body of authority apart from
the Code.
24
Statute of Frauds and parol evidence. Section 2-201 thorough-
ly revises the Statute of Frauds applicable to sale of goods. Sec-
tion 2-209 restates what is commonly called the parol evidence
rule. Related provisions are found in section 2-209 on modifica-
tion and in sections 1-205 and 2-208 on usage of trade, course of
dealing, and course of performance.
The Statute of Frauds section of the Uniform Sales Act was
applicable to choses in action, but the Code provides separately
for investment securities (§ 8-319), for security agreements
(§ 9-203), and for sales of personal property not otherwise cov-
ered (§ 1-206). Section 2-201 is thus confined to sales of goods.
Four major changes are made. First, the signed writing need
not be complete or accurate; it need only be "sufficient to in-
dicate that a contract for sale has been made between the par-
ties," but the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity
shown in the writing. Second, between merchants a written con-
firmation sent by one party and received by the other within a
reasonable time is sufficient against the recipient if it is suf-
ficient against the sender and the recipient has reason to know
its contents and does not object in writing within ten days.
Third, the contract is enforceable against a party who admits in
court that a contract for sale was made, but not beyond the
quantity admitted. Fourth, part payment or acceptance of part
of the goods makes the contract enforceable only to the extent
of the payment or acceptance.
Decisions in Pennsylvania have read these provisions in the
light of the official comments. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania held a seller bound because it had received a signed letter
from the buyer ordering goods "as per our phone conversation
23. Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 166 A.2d 726 (Del. Ch. 1960)
(Pa. law), appeal dismissed, 172 A.2d 63 (Del. 1961).




of today" and stating a quantity.2 5 The object of the statute as
revised, the court said, was "the elimination of certain formalis-
tic requirements adherence to which often resulted in injustice,
rather than the prevention of fraud." Even though the statute
was satisfied, the buyer "must still sustain the burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that the contracts were in fact made
orally prior to the written confirmation." A lower court has
held that a demurrer is not such an admission in court as satis-
fies the statute ;26 there seems as yet to have been no clear ruling
on the question whether the admission can be sought by ex-
amination before trial.2 7 As to part payment, there is a lower
court decision denying enforcement where in the case of a single
object the payment made is less than the full amount.28 The text
of the Code is not perfectly clear on this point, but the comment
seems to permit enforcement only to the extent that the price of
an apportionable part has been made.
A word should be added as to modifying agreements. Sec-
tion 2-209 provides that a modifying agreement needs no con-
sideration to be binding, even though it is oral. It also provides
that the Statute of Frauds section must be satisfied if the con-
tract as modified is within its provisions. If this protection is
deemed inadequate by the parties, they can adopt their own
more severe limitation: "A signed agreement which excludes
modification or rescission except by a signed writing" is made
effective. If such a clause is on a form supplied by a merchant
and is to bind a consumer, it must be separately signed by the
consumer. A modification which is not in writing can take effect
as a waiver despite these provisions; a separate subsection pro-
vides that such a waiver can be retracted unless retraction would
be unjust in view of reliance on the waiver.
Section 2-202 on parol evidence does not seem very startling,
but it provides a basis for judicial clarification of an area which
has been extraordinarily vexed by confusion and uncertainty."
Professor Corbin states that it may properly be applied in non-
Code states and to transactions other than those for the sale of
25. Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 396 Pa. 506, 153
A.2d 472 (1959).
26. Beter v. Helman, 41 West. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
27. See Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORN. L.Q. 355 (1952)
[1953] REP. N.Y. LAw REV. CoMm. 580-581; Smith v. Muss, 203 Misc. 356, 117
N.Y.S.2d 501 (1952), appeal dismissed, 281 App. Div. 957, 122 N.Y.S.2d 377
(1953).
28. Williamson v. Martz, 11 D. & C.2d 33 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
29. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 573-596 (1960).
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goods, and there are decisions which support his statement.8 0
Particularly useful is likely to be the statutory recognition that
a written agreement may be explained or supplemented by course
of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade. Sections
1-205 and 2-208 direct that these elements of the context be
construed whenever reasonable as consistent with the express
terms and with each other. When such construction is unreason-
able, a hierarchy is established: express terms control course of
performance, course of performance controls course of prior
dealings between the parties, and course of dealing controls
usage of trade.
Unconscionable terms. Now we come to one of the most con-
troversial sections of the Code, and one of the most general.
Section 2-302 provides that when a court finds a contract or
any clause to have been unconscionable when made it may refuse
to enforce the contract, enforce it without the offending clause,
or so limit the application of the clause as to avoid any un-
conscionable result. The finding is to be made as a matter of
law and the parties are to be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to the commercial setting, purpose, and
effect of the contract or clause.
The comment cites Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,31 a decision
in the Third Circuit in which the opinion was written by Judge
Goodrich, then also the Director of the American Law Institute.
The lower court denied equitable relief to Campbell Soup Com-
pany as the buyer in a contract for the sale of carrots, on the
ground that the remedy at law was adequate. Disagreeing on
this point, the court of appeals nevertheless affirmed because
the contract was "unconscionable": "the sum total of its provi-
sions drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to
assist."
Campbell Soup Company filed a rather plaintive petition for
rehearing, urging that the issue of unconscionableness was not
considered by the court below, and was not fully presented in
briefs and argument of any of the parties. The petition was
unsuccessful, but it led to the insertion of subsection (2) of
section 2-302, providing for an opportunity to be heard in such
30. Id. § 583 n.94; see Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pember-
ton, 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780 (1962) ; Golden Gate Corp. v. Barrington
College, 199 A.2d 586. (R.I. 1964).
31. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
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cases.82 Incidentally, it may be suggested, with deference, that
there is some exaggeration in the court's statement that Camp-
bell's form had "quite obviously been drawn by a skilled drafts-
man." The provision which the court thought the "hardest" ex-
cused Campbell from taking delivery in certain circumstances,
as in the event of a strike. In such a case, the contract provided,
"Grower may with Campbell's consent, dispose of his Carrots
elsewhere." Read to require the grower to let his carrots spoil,
such a clause might well be against public policy, but it seems
likely that if such a case had been in issue the same court would
have found an implication that consent was not to be unreason-
ably withheld.
I am suggesting that unconscionableness, like public policy,
can be an unruly horse. The comment justifies the section as en-
couraging judicial candor in substitution for such devices as
"adverse construction of language," and cites illustrative cases.
It also seeks to tame the beast: "The principle is one of the pre-
vention of oppression and unfair surprise [citing Campbell] and
not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bar-
gaining power." There are analogues in other provisions of the
Code limiting freedom of contract: Section 1-102 forbids dis-
claimer of obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness,
and care. Section 2-309 provides for notification of termination
of a contract by one party and makes invalid an agreement dis-
pensing with notification "if its operation would be unconscion-
able." Section 2-616 denies effect to a clause made in advance
of trouble which would require the buyer to stand ready to take
delivery whenever the seller is excused from delivery by unfore-
seen circumstances. Under section 2-718 "A term fixing unrea-
sonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty." Section
2-719 states, "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial
is not."
Perhaps these more specific provisions help give content to
the word "unconscionable." Perhaps it can be held to contracts
and clauses which have similar vices. Certainly it is not a war-
rant for judicial price control. But people worry, and you can
see why. A lower court in Pennsylvania held that a clause per-




mitting recovery of the full price of goods not delivered, with-
out any showing whether they were readily salable "would be in
effect 'unreasonably large liquidated damages' and, therefore
unconscionable and void. '33 In the famous Henningsen decision
in New Jersey the court cited section 2-302 in support of its
conclusion that the standard non-warranty clause in the so-called
warranty of a new automobile "is so inimical to the public good
as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity. '34
More recently, in American Home Improvement Co. v. Mae-
Iver,35 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire relied on section
2-302 as an alternative ground of decision. MacIver agreed to
buy home improvements for some $2500, of which apparently
$800 was a salesman's commission and $809.60 was finance
charge. Before delivery MacIver repudiated, and the seller sued
him for the $800 commission paid by it to the salesman. The
court denied recovery because of non-compliance with a statute
requiring disclosure of finance charges. As "another and inde-
pendent reason why recovery should be barred," the court said,
"Inasmuch as the defendants have received little or nothing of
value and under the transaction they entered into they were
paying $1609 for goods and services valued at far less, the con-
tract should not be enforced because of its unconscionable fea-
tures. This is not a new thought or a new rule in this jurisdic-
tion." There is no need to quarrel with the actual decision in
the particular case, but the brevity of the treatment of uncon-
scionableness is troubling. The salesman's commission seems
high, but no reference is made to going rates or to alternative
sources of supply. The finance charge was for monthly install-
ments over a five-year period, and comes to about nine dollars
per year for each hundred dollars of the initial cash balance.
This is equivalent to a nominal annual interest rate of less than
18%, and is less than the maximum rate prescribed in small
loan laws and retail installment sales acts in many states.8 6 As
in the Campbell Soup case, no reference was made to any oppor-
33. Denkin v. Sterner, 10 D. & C.2d 203 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
34. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
35. 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964), 78 HARV. L. Rav. 895; cf. Williaims v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
36. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 399A:3 (Supp. 1963), added in 1961, permits
installment loans at $16 per year per $100 of initial loan on the first $600, $12
per year per $100 on the excess up to $1500. These rates would produce a finance
charge of $1020 on a five-year loan of $1500, but small loan maturities are lim-
ited to 24 months.
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tunity to present evidence on the issue; indeed, the report indi-
cates that the plaintiff furnished no brief.
Warranties and other obligations. Part 3 of article 2 con-
tains a number of provisions designed to fill in gaps commonly
found in sale contracts. I have referred to some of them, and I
shall refer to others in the second lecture. For the most part
they do not make fundamental changes in pre-Code law, but
clarify accepted rules and add specificity. This is generally true,
for example, of the warranty provisions (§§ 2-311 through
2-318). But it may be worth noting that rather specific formal
requirements are laid down for disclaimers of warranty in Sec-
tion 2-316, and that that section draws a distinction between dis-
claimer and limitation of remedy.
Section 2-318 on privity of warranty is already dated. Early
drafts of the Code included provisions for direct action against
a seller by any natural person injured in person by breach of
warranty, if his relation to the buyer was such as to make it
reasonable to expect that he might use, consume, or be affected
by the goods. In addition a prior seller could be impleaded, and
a direct action could be brought against any seller subject to
impleader. These provisions were greatly narrowed in 1951 as
a result of protests from affected industries3 7 Section 2-318 now
includes as beneficiaries of a seller's warranty the family, house-
hold, and guests of the buyer; other provisions for direct action
have been deleted. Beyond this, according to the comment, "the
section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to
his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
chain." Eight states have omitted or modified the section in en-
acting the Code, but the Editorial Board in 1964 rejected a pro-
posal to amend it. The Board said :3s "The section has been criti-
cized in California as 'a step backward,' and the Wyoming revi-
sion codifies the results of recent judicial decisions in many
states. See Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 1962). But beyond the limits of the present section the
subject is still highly controversial, and there appears to be no
national consensus as to the scope of warranty protection which
is proper. Accordingly, no amendment should be made in the
37. See Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6. Bus. LAWYER 113, 157,
162-63, 187-92 (1951).
38. REPORT No. 2 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 40 (1964).
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Official Text." Meanwhile, the case law has continued to de-
velop, forcing a revision broadening the scope of the Restate-
ment section, treating the liability as absolute liability in tort
not subject to warranty limitations, and in some cases extend-
ing beyond consumers and personal injury.9
Risk of loss; excuse. The shift of emphasis in the Code from
property to contract is perhaps most evident with respect to
risk of loss. Section 2-401 states rules on the passing of title
to goods, but confines them to situations "not covered by the
other provisions of this Article." Sections 2-509 and 2-510 deal
explicitly with risk of loss without reference to title, and sec-
tions 2-613 through 2-616 provide for excuse and substituted
performance in cases of casualty, force majeure and frustra-
tion. Here it will be possible only to sketch the structure and
point out the principal innovations.
Risk of loss of course depends on the agreement. Sections
2-307 through 2-311 provide for delivery terms in the absence
of contrary agreement; sections 2-319 through 2-327 spell out
the delivery obligations created by such standard terms as
"F.O.B." Sections 2-501 through 2-508 define the basic concepts
of "identification," "tender of delivery," and "shipment," all
actions which may be taken unilaterally by the seller, and state
the seller's delivery obligations. Then section 2-509 on risk of
loss in the absence of breach states separate rules for cases of
shipment, for goods in storage, and for all other cases. Section
2-510 then provides for placing the risk on a party who is in
breach. If goods are lost or damaged within a reasonable time
after risk has passed to the buyer, section 2-709 entitles the
seller to the full price.
There are no significant surprises in the rules on risk for
cases of shipment and storage. But there is a significant change
from prior law in other cases: if the seller is a merchant, loss
does not pass to the buyer until he takes physical possession of
them or commits a breach. When the buyer is in breach the
seller may for a commercially reasonable time treat the risk
as resting on the buyer, but only to the extent of any deficiency
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 402A .(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964),
followed in Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965)
cf. Piercefield v. Remington. Arms Co., 375 Mich 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965)
Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) ; Yent-
zer v. Taylor Wine Co., 199 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1964). As to Louisiana law, see Note,
19 LA. L. REV. 165 (1958).
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in the seller's effective insurance coverage. If the goods are
non-conforming and the buyer rightfully revokes acceptance, he
may treat the risk as resting on the seller, but only to the extent
of any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage. Note the
focus on insurance.
To illustrate the effect of these provisions, assume a sale
of an identified steam shovel known to be at a particular place,
the buyer to drive it away. Under the old law title and risk of
loss would pass to the buyer when the contract was made.4
Under the Code, if the seller is not a merchant, risk passes on
tender of delivery, that is, when the buyer has had a reasonable
time to take delivery (§ 2-503). If the seller is a merchant, risk
passes when the buyer takes physical possession. If by delaying
the buyer commits a breach, the risk is on him only to the extent
of any deficiency in the seller's effective insurance coverage.
After the buyer's delay has continued beyond a commercially
reasonable time, the seller again has the full risk. As the com-
ment states, the theory is that a merchant in control of goods
can be expected to insure them. Where that expectation is ful-
filled, the principal consequence of the Code rules is to deny the
seller's insurance company a right of subrogation against a de-
faulting buyer. That consequence has sometimes been achieved
under pre-Code law, 41 and it would of course follow if the seller's
insurance policy contained the common clause covering goods
sold but not removed.42
Where risk has not passed, the seller may be excused under
section 2-613 on casualty to identified goods, section 2-614 on
failure of means of delivery or payment, or section 2-615 on
failure of presupposed conditions. These sections codify in very
broad terms the traditional doctrines of impossibility and frus-
tration so far as they give an excuse to the seller, and together
with section 2-616 they provide for excuse of the buyer where
the seller is excused. The comment to section 2-615 suggests
flexible handling of two matters not made explicit in the statu-
tory text: excuse based on frustration of the buyer's purposes,
and equitable adjustment in cases of unjust enrichment or
change of position.
43
40. Thomas G. Jewett, Jr., Inc. v. Keystone Driller Co., 282 Mass. 469, 185
N.E. 369 (1933).
41. See Comment, 22 LA. L. REV. 225, 240 (1961).
42. Cf. e.g., Waring v. Indemnity Fire Ins. Co., 45 N.Y. 606 (1871).
43. Compare Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour,
Ltd., [1943] A.C. 32 (H.L.), with Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act,
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Acceptance and rejection of goods; materiality of breach.
Section 2-601 sets up the basic defensive right of the buyer to
reject goods "if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the contract." Although it has often been
urged that rejection should be limited to cases of material
breach, what has been called "the perfect tender rule" has pre-
vailed on two grounds: the buyer should not be required to guess
at his peril whether a breach is material, and proof of materi-
ality would sometimes require disclosure of the buyer's private
affairs such as secret formulas or processes. 44 The right of re-
jection for immaterial breach is retained, but it is reduced in
importance both by exceptions and by inducements to the buyer
not to exercise the right.
Rejection must be within a reasonable time after delivery or
tender, and the buyer must notify the seller (§ 2-602). The
buyer is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to inspect (§§ 2-513,
2-606), and payment pursuant to a contract calling for payment
before inspection does not prevent later rejection (§ 2-512). The
buyer may reject the whole, or may accept any commercial unit
or units and reject the rest (§ 2-601). In appropriate cases a
merchant buyer is under a duty to follow reasonable instructions
of the seller and even to resell rejected goods for the seller's ac-
count (§§ 2-603, 2-604). The seller may within the contract time
cure a non-conforming tender, and if he had reasonable grounds
to believe the tender would be acceptable he may have a further
reasonable time to cure (§ 2-508). Curable defects are easily
waived (§ 2-605). Where the buyer accepts in anticipation of
cure or without discovery of latent defects, he may revoke his
acceptance and be treated as if he had rejected; but the right
to revoke acceptance is limited to cases where non-conformity
substantially impairs the value to him of the lot or the commer-
cial unit (§ 2-608). In the case of an installment contract, an
installment can be rejected only "if the non-conformity substan-
tially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured
or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required documents";
there is a breach of the whole only if the breach "substantially
impairs the value of the whole contract" (§ 2-612).
1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40; see Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 379-86 (1937).
44. See Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HA&Rv. L. REV.
873, 888 (1939) ; Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457
(1949) ; Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAwYER 113, 160, 194-
95 (1951); [1956] REP. N.Y. LAW REV. Comm. 36-37, 389-90; Braucher, The
1956 Revi8ion of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 VILLANOVA L. REV. 3, 9 (1956).
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Thus the rejecting buyer is subjected to duties, the accepting
buyer is protected against surprise, and the right to reject for
immaterial breach is negated in several important situations.
Acceptance takes place explicitly or by exercise of dominion or
by failure to reject (§ 2-606) ; unless acceptance is revoked, the
accepting buyer must pay for goods accepted, must notify the
seller of breach or be barred from any remedy, and has the bur-
den of establishing breach (§ 2-607). But despite acceptance a
non-conforming delivery may give the buyer reasonable grounds
for insecurity under section 2-609 and justify him in demanding
adequate assurance of due performance. That section seems not
to have 'been put to the test of litigation, and it bristles with
terms of uncertain scope, but it permits a buyer who has "rea-
sonable grounds for insecurity" to demand in writing "adequate
assurance of due performance" and "if commercially reasonable"
to suspend his own performance. Acceptance of an improper
delivery does not prejudice this right as to future performance,
and a seller's failure to furnish the assurance within a reason-
able time is a repudiation (§§ 2-610, 2-611).
Contractual remedies. Here I propose to summarize very
briefly the contractual remedies of buyer and seller, leaving to
the second lecture the problems of control over the goods. 45 The
most significant features of part 7 of article 2 are, first, the
limitation of the buyer's right to recover the goods and the sell-
er's right to recover the price to cases where damage remedies
are inadequate, and second, the fostering of remedies based on
actual resale by the seller or actual substitute purchase by the
buyer. Both can be thought of as carrying out the policy against
waste which underlies the principle of avoidable consequences
or mitigation of damages, or as substituting the equitable prin-
ciples governing specific performance for rules based on prop-
erty in the goods.
Sections 2-702 through 2-710 provide for the full array of
seller's remedies. The aggrieved seller may withhold or stop
delivery, may reclaim from a fraudulent buyer, may identify
goods to the contract and resell them to fix his damages, may
recover damages for non-delivery based on market price or on
lost profits, and in a proper case may recover the price. The
45. For more detailed discussion of remedies under article 2, see Hogan, The
Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 48 CORN. L.Q. 1 (1962) ; Peters, Remedies for Breach
of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199 (1963).
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principal .innovations are a provision for recovery of lost "profit
(including reasonable overhead)" in cases where damages based
on the market are inadequate, as in cases of standard priced
goods (§ 2-708), and the limitation of price recovery, in absence
of acceptance, loss or damage, to cases of goods not readily
resalable.
The buyer's remedies are found in sections 2-711 through
2-717. The principal features are, first, combination of recovery
of money paid and revocation of acceptance with damages for
non-delivery, free of any requirement of election between rescis-
sion and damages, second, damages based on a substitute pur-
chase or "cover" as an alternative to damages based on market
price, third, expansion of specific performance beyond "unique"
goods to "other proper circumstances," and fourth, elimination
of replevin based on property in the goods where "cover" is rea-
sonably available and the seller is solvent.
Sections 2-718 through 2-725 add miscellaneous remedial pro-
visions not found in the Uniform Sales Act. Section 2-718 pro-
vides for liquidated damages and for restitution to a defaulting
buyer, section 2-719 for contractual modification or limitation
of remedy. Succeeding sections preserve damage claims in cases
of "cancellation" or "rescission," negate any doctrine of election
in fraud cases, provide for actions against third parties, and
eliminate difficulties in proof of market price. Section 2-725
establishes a four-year uniform statute of limitations, running
from the date of breach regardless of the aggrieved party's
knowledge. By the original agreement the parties may reduce
the period to not less than one year but may not extend it.
PROPERTY, CREDITORS, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
My first lecture dealt with the contractual obligations of
buyers and sellers under article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Now we turn to the passage of title or property from
seller to buyer and its effect on the rights of third parties, par-
ticularly creditors and purchasers. To focus the discussion, let
us think first of the seller as a creditor or prospective creditor
of the buyer. Primarily we think of him as an unsecured credi-
tor. If he wants to be a secured creditor after the buyer law-
fully obtains possession of the goods, he had better comply with
article 9 of the Code and perfect a security interest, ordinarily
by filing a financing statement.
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But until the debtor lawfully obtains possession of the goods,
section 9-113 cedes jurisdiction to article 2. If the security in-
terest arises solely under article 2, according to section 9-113, no
security agreement is necessary to make the security interest
enforceable, no filing is required to perfect it, and the rights
of the secured party on default are governed by article 2 and
not by article 9. Thus the seller of goods may have the equiva-
lent of a security interest solely by virtue of his status as a seller.
Indeed, the definition of "security interest" in section 1-201 and
section 2-401 on passing of title both provide that retention or
reservation of title or property by a seller of goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a
security interest.
There is no novelty in this. I am referring to the seller's lien
on goods sold. It is a possessory lien, dependent for the most
part on the seller's possession. In article 9 terms, it is a pur-
chase money security interest. What the rights of the parties
are depends first on the terms of the contract. As I said in the
first lecture, section 2-401 makes title or property relevant only
if the situation is not covered by other provisions, and the gen-
eral effect of article 2 is to give effect to the agreement. Thus,
whether we are concerned with the rights between seller and
buyer, rights on default, or rights of creditors of either, pur-
chasers from either, or the trustee in bankruptcy of either, we
begin with the terms of the contract, in particular with the
terms of payment.
Payment terms. At this point I incorporate by reference all
that I said in the first lecture about the formation of contracts,
about offer, acceptance and consideration, about who wins the
battle of the forms, about the effect of parol evidence, usage of
trade and course of dealing, and about interpretation, modifica-
tion and waiver. What are the standard terms of payment? And
what terms are implied, if no terms are agreed on? Section
2-308 provides in general that the place for delivery is the sell-
er's place of business, and section 2-310 provides that payment
is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the
goods. This is cash-and-carry; it is sound in the ordinary super-
market. But if it were universal, there would be no problem of
credit. We all know that credit is very common even in retail
sales to consumers. And between merchants we know that ship-
ment or delivery by the seller is standard and that it is standard
practice to pay within a few days after the invoice is received.
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The point is that terms of credit, like terms of delivery, need
agreement. The agreement may be found in usage of trade, in
course of dealing, or in a contract clause. The payment term
may be "cash with order," "cash before delivery," "cash on de-
livery" (C.O.D.) ; at the other extreme is a "sale or return,"
where payment is to be made only after the buyer resells, and
the seller agrees to take back goods not resold. More standard
are open credit terms like "tenth of month following shipment,"
or "two per cent off for cash in ten days, net cash thirty days."
Here "cash" means that no charge is being made for credit
within the thirty-day period. The ten days and thirty days, ac-
cording to section 2-310, run from time of shipment but post-
dating the invoice or delaying its dispatch will correspondingly
delay the starting of the credit period.
In the absence of any usage or course of dealing or provision
in the contract, section 2-310 provides that payment is due at the
time and place at which the buyer is to receive the goods. In
shipment cases this means when and where the buyer takes
physical possession, not the time and place of delivery to the
carrier (§ 2-103). Thus there is some credit strain on the seller
during transit. On the principle that credit is not extended un-
less a credit term is agreed to, the seller may ship "under reser-
vation," retaining a security interest. Section 2-505 defines such
shipment to include procurement of a negotiable bill of lading
either to the seller's order, to the order of a financing agency
or to the buyer's order or a non-negotiable bill of lading to him-
self or his nominee.
On the same principle, the buyer is not required to pay with-
out inspection unless he has so agreed. Thus if a contract calls
for shipment but makes no further provision, the seller can ship
under a bill of lading to shipper's order, attach the bill to a sight
draft on the buyer, and deliver the documents through banking
channels (§ 2-308). But the buyer is entitled to inspect the goods
after arrival and before payment. If the contract provides for
delivery by way of documents of title, however, payment is due
at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the docu-
ments, and the buyer has no right to inspect before payment
(§ 2-513). "Cash against documents" or "C.O.D." terms have
this effect, as does "C.I.F." unless "payment on or after arrival"
is added. Where payment before inspection is agreed to, a buyer
who pays retains the right to inspect, reject the goods, and re-
cover the payment; but the buyer who fails to pay is ordinarily
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not excused by non-conformity (§ 2-512). Indeed, he may never
learn whether the goods are non-conforming or not.
If the contract provides for a period of open credit, shipment
under reservation is a breach even though inspection by the
buyer before payment is permitted. The seller's security inter-
est is effective nonetheless, but "the rights given to the buyer by
shipment and identification of the goods to the contract" are not
impaired (§ 2-505). In such a case, however, the breach is char-
acterized as "an improper contract for transportation" within
section 2-504, and that section seems to limit rejection on that
ground to cases where "material delay or loss ensues."
It is very common to provide that credit terms may be can-
celled if the buyer's credit becomes impaired. Thus the Standard
Cotton Textile Salesnote set out in the 1960 edition of the Worth
Street Rules provides, "Seller or seller's agent shall have the
right, from time to time, on any unfilled portion of this contract,
to limit any credit to be extended hereunder or to require pay-
ment before delivery, provided, always, that proper adjustment
of discount or allowance of anticipation for such prepayment, be
made. In the event that seller or seller's agent should exercise
this right, buyer agrees to accept invoices subject to such modi-
fied conditions and expressly waives any right to cancel which
such modification might be construed to have created." Other
typical clauses permit the seller to demand payment before the
end of the usual credit period if he deems himself insecure, if
the buyer goes into bankruptcy, and the like.
Section 1-208 provides that in such cases "at will," "when
he deems himself insecure," or words of similar import shall be
construed to give the creditor power to accelerate "only if he
in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or perform-
ance is impaired." As defined, "good faith" here means that
the belief is honest; it need not be reasonable. And the burden
of establishing lack of good faith is on the debtor. One can
imagine a case where the buyer's credit improves after the con-
tract is made, but the seller accelerates with some ulterior mo-
tive. For example, the buyer is temporarily short of cash, and
the seller wants to get out of an unfavorable contract. In that
situation, the Code provides a basis for a claim that the seller
has wrongfully exercised his power of acceleration.
Section 2-609 provides something like a power of accelera-
tion, but without any contract clause. Under that section each
[Vol. XXVI
SALE OF GOODS
party to a contract for sale is under an obligation that the other
party's expectation of receiving due performance will not be im-
paired. If something happens which impairs a seller's expecta-
tion of being paid, he may in writing demand adequate assur-
ance of due performance and may if commercially reasonable
suspend deliveries which have not been paid for. Failure to pro-
vide adequate assurance within a reasonable time not exceeding
thirty days amounts to a repudiation by the buyer. Under sec-
tions 2-610 and 2-611 repudiation permits the aggrieved seller to
resort to any remedy for breach.
This is a generalized equivalent of the acceleration clause,
but it is limited to cases where there are "reasonable grounds
for insecurity" rather than a mere honest belief, and the remedy
is to suspend performance and stop delivery rather than to speed
up payment. The rule of law as stated is novel, although the com-
ment refers to statutory and judicial precedents, but the prac-
tice is not. If a seller is not going to get paid, he does not ship
the goods, whatever the law says. Often he had a fair chance,
under pre-Code law, of defending against a claim for damages
by the buyer. But he was likely to lose his own claim for dam-
ages unless he could show that the buyer was actually insolvent
or was first in breach. Section 2-609 provides machinery, fair
to both parties, where the situation is unclear.
Rights of a seller in possession. Let us turn to the seller's
power to control the goods where he is the aggrieved party. I
shall begin with the seller in possession, then deal with goods
in transit and with reclamation from the buyer. At each stage
I shall refer also to the possibility that creditors of the buyer
or purchasers from the buyer may have competing interests.
Before goods are identified to the contract, of course, the
buyer has no interest in any particular goods. By identification,
according to section 2-401, he acquires "a special property as
limited by this Act," and that interest is excluded from the defi-
nition of "security interest" (§ 1-201). The seller's interest
after identification is not so excluded; apparently it may or may
not be a "security interest," except that after shipment or deliv-
ery to the buyer any reservation of an interest by the seller is
limited in effect to the reservation of a security interest. But the
provisions of section 2-401 apply only to situations not otherwise
covered, where "matters concerning title become material."
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Identification is defined in section 2-501. Unlike "appropria-
tion" in the Uniform Sales Act, identification may apparently
be the unilateral act of the seller, even though the goods identi-
fied are non-conforming; it may occur "when goods are shipped,
marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which
the contract refers." The buyer then has a special property and
an insurable interest, but the seller may also have an insurable
interest, and where the identification is by the seller alone he
may until default or insolvency or notification to the buyer that
the identification is final substitute other goods. Either buyer
or seller may sue a third party for injury to goods; the suit or
settlement of the party who does not have the risk of loss is, sub-
ject to his own interest, as fiduciary for the other (§ 2-722).
In this situation, the seller in possession has more than a
security interest at least so long as he bears the risks of loss.
Moreover, he has reasonably complete legal power over the goods
in the event of the buyer's default or insolvency. In the event
of insolvency he may refuse delivery except for cash (§ 2-702) ;
in the event of breach he may withhold delivery (§ 2-703), may
identify conforming goods to the contract if they are in his pos-
session or control at the time he learns of the breach, and may
treat as the subject of resale goods demonstrably intended for
the particular contract even though unfinished. He may com-
plete manufacture "in the exercise of reasonable commercial
judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective reali-
zation," or he may resell unfinished goods for scrap or salvage
value or proceed in any other reasonable manner (§ 2-704).
Section 2-706 permits the seller to resell in order to fix his
damages. Such a resale is much like a resale to enforce an arti-
cle 9 security interest, except that there is no duty to account
for any profit on the resale. The seller resells at public or pri-
vate sale in any commercially reasonable manner, and can then
recover the difference between the contract price and the resale
price together with incidental damages, but less expense saved.
Although the seller can keep any profit made on a resale, a fi-
nancing agency or other holder of a security interest or "person
in the position of a seller" (§ 2-707) must account for any ex-
cess over the amount of his security interest. Alternatively, the
seller may keep the goods or sell them for his own account and
recover damages based on market price. All these rights of the
seller in possession, whether or not they are called a security
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interest, seem to be superior to the interests of creditors of the
buyer and purchasers from the buyer.
Goods in storage and in transit. Where goods are out of the
seller's possession but have not yet reached the buyer, section
2-705 confers on the seller a right to stop delivery by notifying
the carrier or other bailee. Like the traditional right of stop-
page in transit, this right arises in cases of insolvency of the
buyer; it is extended to other grounds for withholding or re-
claiming goods in cases of carload, truckload, planeload, or
larger shipments of express or freight. The right terminates
when the buyer receives the goods, when a bailee other than a
carrier acknowledges to the buyer that he holds the goods for
the buyer, when a carrier so acknowledges by reshipment or as
warehouseman, or when a negotiable document of title is nego-
tiated to the buyer. The right is subject to the rights of the
bailee and of any person to whom a negotiable document of title
has been duly negotiated.
If the seller has shipped under reservation, he has similar
powers by virtue of his security interest and the powers given
him by the document of title, but the powers are not limited to
cases of insolvency or carload shipments. Where a draft relating
to a shipment is paid or purchased by a financing agency, the
financing agency acquires the seller's rights in the goods, in-
cluding the right to stop delivery and the right to have the draft
honored by the buyer (§ 2-506). Documents attached to a draft
are to be delivered on acceptance of the draft if payable more
than three days after presentment; otherwise, only on payment
(§ 2-514). Thus a sight draft with order bill of lading attached
is much like shipment C.O.D., except that collection through
banking channels is contemplated, rather than collection by the
carrier. In all these cases the seller or financing agency who
stops delivery can resell like a seller in possession.
Reclamation. Article 2 gives the seller control over goods in
the buyer's possession in some circumstances even though the
seller does not reserve a security interest. Here we must deal
with sale on approval, sale or return and certain consignments,
with cash sales, and with misrepresentations by the buyer.
Where the buyer has an option to return conforming goods, sec-
tion 2-326 provides that there is a "sale on approval" if the
goods are delivered primarily for use, a "sale or return" if the
goods are delivered primarily for resale. Goods on approval are
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not subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors until accept-
ance, goods held on sale or return are subject to such claims
while in the buyer's possession.
Delivery of goods to an agent of the seller is normally not
a sale within the meaning of article 2. But section 2-326 covers
certain consignments for sale. Where goods are delivered to the
consignee for sale, and the consignee maintains a place of busi-
ness at which he deals in such goods under a name other than
the consignor's, "with respect to the claims of creditors" of the
consignee "the goods are deemed to be on sale or return." Three
modes of escape are provided: an applicable law providing for a
sign showing the consignor's interest, general knowledge that
the consignee is substantially engaged in selling the goods of
others, and compliance "with the filing provisions" of article 9.
It should also be noted that article 9 applies fully to a "consign-
ment intended as security" (§ 9-102), but that the definition of
"security interest" excludes a consignment not intended as secu-
rity (§ 1-201).
Thus there are two types of consignments referred to in the
Code. A consignment intended as security is a security interest
in inventory and must normally be perfected by filing, but in
some circumstances it may be perfected for twenty-one days
without filing (§ 9-304) ; it will ordinarily be entitled to priority
as a purchase money security interest, but only if notification is
given to a competing secured party who filed first (§§ 9-107,
9-312). A "true" consignment, on the other hand, is an agency
for most purposes but is deemed to be a sale or return as against
creditors. The "deeming" will prevent reclamation in the bank-
ruptcy of the consignor, but the right to reclaim can be saved
by compliance with the "filing provisions" of article 9. Are the
"filing provisions" limited to the provisions on the mechanics of
filing in part 4 of article 9, entitled "Filing"? Or do they also
include provisions as to when filing is required, the consequences
of non-filing, and priority of filed interests? The phrase "filing
provisions" seems to be used in the narrower sense in section
9-302 (3), and this is the simpler and clearer reading, but a con-
signor might be wise to take the necessary steps under both read-
ings. For example, he might well give the notification called
for by section 9-312. We get no help on these questions from
judicial decisions; the only decision thus far is a Massachusetts
[Vol. XXVI
SALE OF GOODS
case denying a consignor a right to replevy from an assignee for
the consignee's creditors where there had been no filing.4
The rights of a consignor may also be defeated by a bona
fide purchase from the consignee. Section 2-403 would protect
a "buyer in ordinary course of business," a concept to be dis-
cussed hereafter. Where that section is inapplicable the pur-
chaser might be protected by the law of agency or by a selling
factor's act. If the consignee granted a security interest with-
out authority, the secured party could apparently take advan-
tage of a failure of the consignor to file by virtue of the fact that
"creditor" is defined to include "a secured creditor" (§ 1-201).
The importance of consignment as a mode of distribution may
be somewhat reduced by a recent Supreme Court decision under
the anti-trust laws,47 but that is not within our present scope.
A second basis for reclamation is the cash sale. "Where pay-
ment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods
or documents of title," according to section 2-507, "his right as
against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon
his making the payment due." The comment adds that the condi-
tion may be waived by the seller's failure to follow up his rights,
and that the ten-day limit of section 2-702 is applicable. The
section must be read with the provision in section 2-511 that
payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the
parties by dishonor. The comment states that insofar as third
parties are concerned acceptance of a post-dated check amounts
to a delivery on credit and remits the seller to section 2-702, but
that as between buyer and seller section 2-507 on conditional de-
livery remains applicable. 48 This suggests that if the check is
not post-dated and the condition is not waived the seller prevails
over the buyer's creditors and hence over his trustee in bank-
ruptcy. Even if the seller's right to reclaim is considered to be
a security interest, this result can be reconciled with section
9-113 on the ground that the buyer in such a case does not "law-
fully" obtain possession. 49 But a good faith purchaser from the
buyer for value is explicitly protected in all such cases by sec-
tion 2-403 on the ground that the buyer has a voidable title. A
46. General Electric Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 199 N.E.2d 326 (Mass.
1964).
47. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
48. See Commonwealth v. Kelinson, 199 Pa. Scper. 135, 184 A.2d 374 (1962).
49. McAuliffe & Burke Co. v. Gallagher, 258 Mass. 215, 154 N.E. 755 (1927)
see 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 620 (rev. ed. 1948).
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person to whom the buyer gives a security interest is accorded
this protection as a "purchaser" (§ 1-201).
The third type of right to reclaim relates to goods delivered
on credit to an insolvent buyer. Section 2-702 gives the seller
a right to reclaim in such cases. The right is severely limited,
and displaces any other right to reclaim based on "the buyer's
fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of in-
tent to pay." Other grounds for avoiding the buyer's title are
not within the scope of the section, but may be subject to similar
rules either by analogy or as a matter of common law. Under
the section no finding of misrepresentation is required; the right
to reclaim arises automatically if the seller makes a demand
within ten days after an insolvent buyer receives goods on credit.
The ten-day limit does not apply, however, if the buyer has made
a misrepresentation of solvency to the particular seller in
writing within three months before delivery. As in other cases
of voidable title, section 2-403 protects the good faith purchaser
from the buyer for value. Successful reclamation bars all other
remedies with respect to the same goods, because in the words
of the comment reclamation "constitutes preferential treatment
as against the buyer's other creditors."
The sponsors recognized from the beginning that the right
of reclamation might not be honored in bankruptcy, particularly
where no fraud was shown. But the sponsors relied on decisions
allowing reclamation in bankruptcy on the basis of what the
comment calls a "tacit business misrepresentation of solvency."
As a sponsors' subcommittee reported in 1955, "Comment 2 sets
up a fraud theory which might well be followed under the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Act to preserve the right of reclamation
granted by this section .... But state law cannot resolve such
questions, and should not try."50 The opinion in In re Kravitzl
is consistent with the sponsors' hopes on this point, but it dis-
closed another difficulty. According to section 2-702 the seller's
right to reclaim is "subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary
course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor under this
50. See UCC Supp. No. 1, at 106, Jan. 1955, citing California Conserving Co.
v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933) ; cf. Kamberg v. Springfield Nat'l Bank,
293 Mass. 24, 199 N.E. 339 (1935) ; Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel
Security in the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 B.U.L. REv. 571 (1958).
51. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960) ; see Hawkland, The Relative Rights of Lien
Creditors and Defrauded Sellers, 67 Com. L.J. 86 (1962) ; Kennedy, The Trustee
in Bankruptcy under the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 RuTGERa L. REV. 518
(1960) ; Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3),
14 W. RFa. L. REV. 93 (1962).
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Article (Section 2-403)." The reference to buyers and purchasers
is clear enough, but all section 2-403 says about "lien creditors"
is that their rights are governed by articles 6, 7, and 9. In this
situation the court looked to the pre-Code law of Pennsylvania,
found that a lien creditor who extended credit subsequent to the
sale would prevail over a defrauded seller, and held that the
trustee as an "ideal lien creditor" under section 70c of the Bank-
ruptcy Act similarly prevailed.
In this situation the sponsors of the Code in Illinois, with
Professor Llewellyn, the chief draftsman, participating, omitted
the words "or lien creditor" from section 2-702, intending to
avoid the Kravitz result, and several states followed the Illinois
lead.52 A sponsor's subcommittee recommended approval of the
Illinois solution, but the Editorial Board was "not convinced
that the decision in In re Kravitz requires an amendment of this
section," stating the Pennsylvania rule applied in that case and
adding that "In most states the pre-Code law was otherwise."5'
A new paragraph of comment was added, explaining that the
rights of lien creditors under article 2 include rights under sec-
tion 2-326 on consignment sales as well as rights under articles
6, 7, and 9, and accepting In re Kravitz as an application of
supplementary principles (§ 1-103) not displaced by section
2-702.
The bankruptcy rule applied in the Kravitz case, that section
70c of the Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee the status of an
"ideal lien creditor," is now of doubtful standing. The Supreme
Court has denied that the trustee can assert the rights of a
hypothetical creditor extending credit during a period of delay
in filing, when no actual creditor had such rights.M It would
be a short step to deny him any rights given only to a special
class of creditors, unless there was an actual creditor who was
a member of the class.5 5 If this view should prevail, the seller's
right to reclaim could be defeated, even in Pennsylvania, only
if some actual creditor extended credit to the bankrupt after
the fraudulent sale.
The buyer's right to recover goods. Now let us shift our
attention to the situation where the buyer is aggrieved by the
52. California, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York.
53. See IHOPORT No. 1 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 70, 137 (1962) ; note 49 supra.
54. Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
55. Cf. Pacific Fin. Co. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962).
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conduct of the seller. The buyer's interest in identified goods,
you will remember, is not a security interest. The buyer can
get a security interest by complying with article 9, but unless
he does so his interest is called a special property. It carries
with it an insurable interest and a right to sue third-party tort-
feasors. When substitute goods are not readily available, the
buyer may have a right to specific performance or replevin.
These are rights of the beneficial owner, and are probably not
within the condemnation of "equitable liens" in section 60a of
the Bankruptcy Act. The same may be said of the right to
replevy under section 2-502 if the seller becomes insolvent within
ten days after receipt of the first installment on their price,
but rights arising on insolvency may be vulnerable in bankruptcy
as state-created priorities. The theory of the draftsmen was
that pre-Code law permitted replevin based on property much
more broadly, that the effect of the Code was to limit the right
given the buyer by pre-Code law, which was effective in bank-
ruptcy. On this theory, the right to replevin is not a mere
priority, and it would be defeated by the seller's bankruptcy
only if the seller's creditors could defeat it. This brings us to
the question what rights the creditors of a seller have to sold
goods in his possession. We are now assuming that the buyer
has not perfected an article 9 security interest.
Rights of the seller's creditors. Section 2-402 provides that
with two exceptions the rights of the seller's unsecured creditors
are subject to the buyer's rights to recover identified goods.
One exception saves any rule of law under which the seller's
retention of possession is fraudulent, but provides that retention
of possession in good faith and current course of trade by a
merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale
is not fraudulent. The other exception preserves rules of law
defining fraudulent transfers or voidable preferences in trans-
actions not in current course of trade.
Probably the prevailing view is that a seller's retention of
possession is prima facie fraudulent, but that fraud may be
rebutted by proof of the buyer's good faith. In some states, how-
ever, retention of possession is fraud per se. The Code carries
forward the difference of opinion, following the example of the
Uniform Sales Act, except for the case of the merchant-seller
in current course. In Massachusetts, the rule of Lanfear v.
Sumner 56 was not originally a rule of fraud, but simply a rule
56. 17 Mass. 110 (1821).
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that property did not pass except as between the parties until
there was a delivery. But the Sales Act carried the rule for-
ward,57 and the similar language of the Code should have the
same effect.
The rule that retention of possession is prima facie fraud
or fraud per se may give protection to secured creditors of the
seller. Only unsecured creditors are covered by section 2-402 (1),
but subsection (2) on fraudulent retention of possession applies
to "a creditor," and the definition of creditor includes secured
creditors (§ 1-201). If there is no fraud on creditors, a buyer
who gives value and receives delivery without knowledge takes
free of an unperfected security interest (§ 9-301) ; a buyer in
ordinary course takes free of a perfected security interest
(§ 9-307). We will return to the definition of buyer in ordinary
course; suffice it for now that it probably only applies when
the buyer receives the goods. While the goods are in the seller's
possession, there seems to be no provision subjecting the buyer's
special property to a security interest subsequently created by
the seller, -except for the fraud provision. Aside from fraud,
then, priority would seem to depend on which interest is created
first.
Buyers in ordinary course. Where a seller retains possession
of goods sold and then resells to a second buyer, the Code pro-
tects the second buyer only if he is a "buyer in ordinary course
of business." This is the effect of section 2-403(2), one of the
most widely discussed provisions of the Code, to which I have
referred several times. It has a broader scope than cases of
sellers in possession: "Any entrusting of possession of goods
to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power
to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course of business." Perhaps its principal application will be to
cases of entrusting by financial institutions, as where a finance
company repossesses an automobile and leaves it with a used-car
dealer.5 18 Discussion has often focused on the watch entrusted
for repair to a jeweller who also sells watches, but such cases
are less likely to be prominent in litigation.
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" is a narrower term
in several respects than the "good faith purchaser for value"
57. Hesse v. Lockwood, 264 Mass. 524, 163 N.E. 86 (1928).
58. Cf. Budget Plan, Inc. v. Savoy, 336 Mass. 322, 145 N.E.2d 710 (1957)
Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961).
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who takes a good title from a seller with a voidable title. Both
must take in good faith and for value, and the value may be a
mere promise to pay. But "purchase" includes taking in bulk or
as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money
debt; "buyer in ordinary course" excludes such transactions and
purchases by pawnbrokers. To buy in ordinary course one must
buy from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind
(§ 1-102).
What of delivery? The "good faith purchaser for value" who
gets a good title under section 2-403 apparently need not take
poessession. In this respect he is different from the person to
whom a negotiable document of title is "duly negotiated" (§ 7-
501), from the "bona fide purchaser" of an investment security
(§ 8-302), and the buyer not in ordinary course who takes free
of an unperfected security interest (§ 9-301) ; in the three latter
cases "delivery" is explicitly required. As to the "buyer in
ordinary course of business," the definition states that " 'Buy-
ing' . . . includes receiving goods or documents of title under a
preexisting contract for sale" and I infer that "Buying" does
not take place for this purpose at any earlier stage. This con-
clusion is not entirely free from doubt, but it reaches sound
results and conforms to the definition in the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act which is said in comment to be the source of the
definition. There is no hint of any intent to make a change on
this point, and it seems doubtful that so important a change
would have been left to inference.
Rights of the buyer in possession. Section 2-711 provides
that the buyer who rejects or revokes acceptance has a security
interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments
made on their price and for his expenses. Such a security inter-
est arises under article 2, and he may resell like an aggrieved
seller but must account for any surplus (§ 2-706).
: In other cases the buyer who takes possession and whose
rights are not voidable by the seller acquires all title which the
seller had or had power to transfer (§ 2-403). These rights
include those already referred to in connection with the discus-
sion of the good faith purchaser for value and the buyer in ordi-
nary course of business. The buyer remains subject, however,
to the rights of a former owner who did not deliver the goods
under a transaction of purchase or entrust them to a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind. And a buyer who is not pro-
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tected as a good faith purchaser or buyer in ordinary course
remains subject to defects in his seller's title and to the claims
of the seller's creditors under the law relating to fraud on credi-
tors and voidable preferences. Most such claims are left to other
bodies of law, but article 6 of the Code provides for the avoid-
ance of bulk sales.
Bulk sales.5 9 The basic purpose of the bulk sales laws is to
deal with two common forms of commercial fraud involving a
merchant owing debts who sells out his stock in trade. In one
form, the sale is a sham and the seller hopes to come back later;
in the other, he simply disappears. The remedy, carried forward
by the Code, is to require advance notice to creditors. The Code
provisions are somewhat more detailed and, I think, clearer than
the prior statutes, and they exempt a number of transactions
where the delay and red tape are not justified.
The Code provisions apply if there is a transfer in bulk, not
in the ordinary course, of a "major part" of the inventory of
an enterprise whose principal business is the sale of merchandise
from stock. A "major part" is commonly understood to mean
more than half. Manufacturers may be covered, but intangibles
are not. Equipment is covered only in connection with a transfer
of inventory. Service enterprises are excluded because unsecured
credit on the faith of inventory is uncommon. Lower courts in
Pennsylvania have held a restaurant-taproom covered, but a
printer not. 0 Security transfers, foreclosure and execution sales
and the like, and transfers of exempt property are exempt, as
are transfers to successor businesses which give public notice
and assume the transferor's debts, if the transferee is solvent
or the transferor receives nothing except an interest junior to
creditors.
When a transfer is covered, the transferor must furnish a
sworn list of creditors and a schedule of the property, and the
transferee must preserve the list and schedule or file them in
a public office. The transferee must give notice to the creditors
at least ten days before he takes possession or pays. A short
form of notice is provided where the debts are to be paid, a
longer form in other cases. Special provision is made for
auctioneers. The creditors in question are all those holding
59. Compare LA. R.S. 9:2961-2968 (1950).
60. Uhr v. 3361, Inc., 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 348 (1960) ; Markert v. College Off -
set Press, Inc., 6 Pa. D. & C.2d 519 (1957).
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claims based on events before the transfer, apparently including
disputed and unliquidated claims.
Failure to comply renders the transfer ineffective against
creditors of the transferor, except that an innocent transferee
is protected against errors in the list of creditors. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has held that the transferee cannot avoid
the sale for non-compliance.61 An optional section adopted in
nine states6 2 imposes a duty on the transferee to see that credi-
tors are paid; other states impose no such duty.63 Good faith
purchasers from the transferee for value and without notice are
protected, apparently without regard to delivery, and a six
months statute of limitations is provided, barring both actions
and levies unless the transfer has been concealed.
It may be worth pointing out that the sanctions for non-
compliance can be severe. If a bulk transfer is carried out in
blithe disregard of the statute, as has often happened under
prior statutes, the transferee may pay the full price once to
the transferor and a second time to creditors who later appear.
He may then think he is safe, but the transfer remains ineffec-
tive against other creditors still undiscovered. In a state where
the transferee has a duty to see creditors paid, this third round
of liability is avoided by giving credit for sums believed in good
faith to be properly payable; in other states liability can be
limited by surrendering the property. A safe course if there
is no concealment is to place the price in escrow until the six-
month limitation period has run.6 4
We may close with the bizarre situation which arose in In re
Dee's, Inc.65 A merchant made a bulk transfer to his own
wholly-owned corporation, without complying with the statute.
The corporation soon became bankrupt, and later the merchant
also became bankrupt. The two trustees in bankruptcy both
claimed the property, and the court ruled that the transferee's
trustee prevailed because his rights attached first. The holding
61. Macy v. Oswald, 198 Pa. Super. 435, 182 A.2d 94 (1962).
62. Alaska, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, Tennessee, West Virginia. This list does not cover enactments during
1965.
63. Of. Albertson v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 627, 133 S.E.2d 897 (1963).
64. In Massachusetts there was no such time limit before the Code, and a suit
after twelhe months was held not barred by laches. Security Nat'l Bank v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 345 Mass. 434, 187 N.E.2d 820 (1963).
65. 311 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1962).
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seems to be based on a principle which would be rejected in most
states, that a levying creditor has the rights of a bona fide pur-
chaser.66
66. See note 49 supra.
